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Abstract: Sanctions are a type of policy instrument that have emerged as one of the most popular and 
effective tools of foreign policy. According to sanction theory analysts, sanctions are seldom regarded as the 
“ideal” weapon; rather they are seen as the “least bad” alternative. Both as an alternative to armed force 
and, conversely, the often burdensome diplomatic solutions on offer, the salience of sanctions to 
international security politics is increasingly apparent. It is the increased use of economic or political 
leverage that has triggered the debate among the host of scholars and foreign policy experts. There are 
many scholars who have detailed about the efficacy of sanction whereas others have out rightly rejected the 
imposition of sanctions as a successful foreign policy tool. This paper seeks to look at the various aspects of 
sanctions as a foreign policy tool in detail. 
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To begin with, one should know what defines a 
policy instrument? Evert Vedung sees these tools 
as “a set of techniques by which governmental 
authorities wield their power in attempting to 
ensure support and effect or prevent social change” 
(Vedung 1998). 
Sanctions are also a type of policy instrument that 
have emerged as one of the most popular and 
effective tools of foreign policy. In general, a 
country can address foreign policy disputes in five 
different ways: diplomatic negotiations, political 
coercion, economic coercion, covert action and 
military intervention. Moreover, well thought 
policy responses often involve a combination of 
these tools.  
Sanctions are majorly imposed in the course of 
foreign policy initiative, as either political coercion 
or economic coercion. Interestingly, it is the later 
form of foreign policy initiative that is used more 
often lately. According to sanction theory analysts, 
sanctions are seldom regarded as the “ideal” 
weapon; rather they are seen as the “least bad” 
alternative. Both as an alternative to armed force 
and, conversely, the often burdensome diplomatic 
solutions on offer, the salience of sanctions to 
international security politics is increasingly 
apparent. Sanctions are overused in the last few 
decades as demonstrated by the huge number of 
sanctions episodes in recent past. Hufbauer, Schott 
and Elliott did a comprehensive study of sanctions 
and reported 103 cases of sanctions since the 
beginning of World War I where they were 
deployed by a number of countries in pursuance of 
their foreign policy goals (Hufbauer, Schott and 
Elliott 1985). 
Margaret Doxey, an eminent authority in the field 
of economic sanctions defines international 
sanctions as:  
      “Penalties threatened or imposed as a declared 
consequence of the target‟s failure to observe 
international standards or international obligations” 
(Doxey 1996). 
Dictionary meaning of the term „Sanctions‟ is 
granting of official permission or approval for an 
action and at the same time a threatened penalty or 
punishment for disobeying a law or rule. Sanctions 
are not a new phenomenon in international politics. 
Economic sanctions are economic measures 
directed to political objectives. The relationship 
between economic activity and political behaviour 
is generally rested on an assumption that the 
authority of a political regime is believed to depend 
ultimately upon its economic strength.  
Sanctions as a policy tool have been in use since 
the Athenian boycott of Megara approximately 
2,400 years ago, that helped to trigger the 
Peloponnesian war (431-404 BC). As Renwick 
observed, “States since time immemorial had 
interrupted commercial relations or sought to 
withhold essential supplies when in a state of war 
or near war with one another” (Renwick 1981). 
Sanctions, in the framework of international 
relations, are „jaded tactics that has become less 
and less useful in the modern international 
economic system, particularly since the 1920s‟ 
(Cortright & Lopez 1995). 
Sanctions are said to be imposed when the „sender‟ 
threatens to interrupt the status quo and/or blocks a 
stream of economic exchange with the „target‟ 
unless the sanctioned country acquiesces to a 
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specific demand made by the „sender‟. If the 
„target‟ complies with „senders‟ demand, sanctions 
are not imposed. If the „target‟ stands firm, the 
„sender‟ faces a choice between backing down or 
carrying out its threat and imposing sanctions.   
The main goal of economic sanctions is to lower 
the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by 
reducing international trade in order to coerce the 
target government to change its political behaviour 
(Pape 1997). 
SCOPE OF SANCTIONS 
In recent as well as past history, we have seen a 
series of interventions in trade between nations for 
the purpose of forcing good political conduct by 
means of economic pressure (Amerongen 1980). 
And while doing so, the scope of sanctions practice 
became very wide, ranging from unilateral attempt 
to multilateral support and then moving on to near 
universal sanctions regime imposed by an 
international organisation. 
Unilateral sanctions are said to be imposed when a 
single „sender‟ state on its own imposes sanctions 
against a single „target‟ state. For example, the 
United States has aimed sanctions at governments 
that consistently violate internationally recognized 
human rights, at governments that sponsor 
international terrorism or harbour terrorists targeted 
at governments, individuals or corporations that 
engage in the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) or traffic narcotics and also 
aim at governments that conduct aggression against 
their neighbours to destabilise regional peace or 
threaten U.S. National Security. Despite of 
sanctions being an ineffective policy instrument in 
various cases, it is still a popular tool of foreign 
policy. Hufbauer et al. (1990, 2007), who have 
compiled the most extensive data set on economic 
sanctions to date, found that these coercive 
measures were successful only in one third of all 
cases.  
There are different views regarding the impacts of 
unilateral versus multilateral sanctions. Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg argue that unilateral sanctions are 
likely to be more effective than multilateral 
sanctions in achieving their sought-after political 
results, even if unilateral sanctions perhaps reflect 
the interests of narrow groups in the sanctioning 
countries more than a global political consensus 
(Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2000). 
According to Alexander Kern, unilateral sanctions 
can be divided into three categories: first, 
Retorsion, under this sender state applies retortive 
measures when the target state disagrees with 
foreign policy objectives or breaches a legal 
obligation. These Retortive measures include 
restricting trade, suspending economic assistance 
or the aids given to the target state (Kern 2009). 
Second, countermeasures/ non- forcible reprisals 
are a response to a foreign state that has committed 
an unlawful act that results in non-compliance with 
international obligations. Breaches of treaties and 
customary international law may entitle a state to 
take the course of countermeasures.  
Third are the punitive sanctions, these are coercive 
and often take the form of a penalty or fine 
imposed on the target. United States sanctions 
against Iran during Bill Clinton Administration 
took the form of punitive sanctions. 
However, recent years have witnessed a noticeable 
change, a movement away from unilateral 
diplomacy and toward increased reliance on 
multilateralism in international relations. This shift 
has been evident in the recent application of 
sanctions cases. Because, of an inherent belief that 
multilateral sanctions are more likely to be 
effective than unilateral sanctions. International 
institutions such as international organizations also 
play an important role in the process of multilateral 
sanctions.  
Drezner observed regarding multilateralism that 
“International organizations play a decisive role in 
sustaining cooperation over time; they also suggest 
the mechanism through which this is accomplished. 
International organizations maintain cooperation 
not through the ex post punishment of defectors but 
through the ex ante reassurance of actors by 
developing common conjectures and blunting 
domestic pressures to defect” (Drezner 2000). 
Daniel W Drezner defines Economic Coercion as 
the threat or act by a nation state or coalition of 
nation sates called „the sender‟, to disrupt 
economic exchange with another nation state, 
called „the target‟, unless the targeted country 
acquiesces to an articulated political demand. And 
he further stresses on the point that the underlying 
assumption regarding the use of economic 
sanctions is that they are an important indicator of 
domestic and symbolic politics but inconsequential 
tool of statecraft (Drezner 2000). 
Thus, as stated by some researchers, nowadays 
economic sanctions could work effectively only in 
a situation with international consensus backing 
their implementation or, at least, with the support 
of major international players and the trading 
partners of a sanctioned country (Elliott & 
Kimberly 1998). There seems a consensus among 
the scholars of political economy that unilateral 
sanctions are doomed to fail and there exists 
chances for successful sanctions of any 
significance when it is applied multilaterally or 
internationally.  
Therefore, the existing literature suggests a logical 
reason that empirically, sanctions are more 
successful when they exert greater economic costs 
on the target, and multilateral sanctions generally 
impose greater economic costs than unilateral 
sanctions; but multilateral sanctions are no more 
successful than unilateral sanctions always. 
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Needless to say, this is very difficult in today‟s 
multi polar world. Because of conflict of interests, 
as the number of the actors increases the harder it 
becomes to obtain consensus. 
TYPES OF SANCTIONS AND THEIR 
OBJECTIVES 
Sanctions as foreign policy instrument have also 
been an important subject of discussion among the 
policy makers and academic circles. It is the 
increased use of economic or political leverage that 
has triggered the debate among the host of scholars 
and foreign policy experts. There are many 
scholars who have detailed about the efficacy of 
sanction whereas others have out rightly rejected 
the imposition of sanctions as a successful foreign 
policy tool.  
Diplomatic sanctions are also used by policy 
makers in order to isolate and put diplomatic 
pressure on the target country. Diplomatic 
sanctions are characterized by severing formal 
diplomatic ties with a country or significantly 
downgrading ties from the normal level of 
diplomatic activity for foreign policy purposes 
(Maller 2009).  
A diplomatic sanction would include denying 
government officials the ability to travel abroad, 
requiring them to recall ambassadors, or refusing 
them access to international forums, such as the 
United Nations or regional international bodies. For 
example, the United States and eleven European 
Nations imposed diplomatic sanctions on Syria in 
1986. Here, ordinary citizenry is not directly and 
intentionally harmed, diplomatic sanctions do not 
violate norms of diplomatic immunity. 
Nevertheless, diplomatic sanctions may be more 
symbolic than substantive and therefore only 
minimally effective (Winkler 1999).   
Analysts argue that the effect of trade and financial 
sanctions on the sanctioning country in terms of 
costs is not clear and can change from case to case, 
the result of diplomatic sanctions is certain to affect 
the sanctioning country to the same extent as the 
target country. In the case of economic sanctions, 
both parties bear the consequences of the sanctions 
on the basis of their economic capacity and 
investments in bilateral trade, but because 
communication is the flow of two-sided 
information, diplomatic sanctions cut this flow for 
both parties no matter which one is economically 
and militarily more powerful. 
On one hand, non-engagement makes the 
sanctioning country less informed about the target 
state and causes the loss of valuable intelligence, 
and on the other hand, as a consequence of the loss 
of communications, the sanctioning country loses 
its ability to influence the sanctioned country. The 
Critics of this approach argue that engagement with 
these regimes is tantamount to appeasement and 
signals acceptance of behaviour that ought to be 
condemned.   
Sanctions are mostly economic but also political 
and military penalties introduced to alter political 
and/or military behaviour. They take the forms of 
financial restrictions, foreign assistance reductions 
and cut-offs, export- import restrictions, revocation 
of MFN status(Most Favoured Nation), asset 
freezes, tariff increases, investment prohibitions, 
votes in international organizations, withdrawal of 
diplomatic relations, visa denials, travel bans and 
arms embargos, employed from time to time in 
multilateral and unilateral fashion.  
Interestingly, Sanctions are also important tools by 
which governments dole out rents to special 
interests, make symbolic statements, send signals 
to group of allies and indicate to various interest 
groups in target countries objection to their actions 
or support for their causes. These are often termed 
as Positive Sanctions. And, David Baldwin in his 
book Economic Statecraft states that the two types 
of sanctions positive and negative sanctions are 
meant to exercise power and particularly to foster 
cooperation among countries (Baldwin 1985). 
Analysts of sanctions theory express that Sanctions 
have long been an important stage between the 
„talking therapy‟ of diplomacy and the use of 
„military force‟ (Crawford and Klotz, 1999; 
Baldwin and Pape, 1998; Pape 1997; 
Gottenmoeller 2012, Chaitkin, 2009). Since 1970s 
sanctions have gained popularity. But after the end 
of the Cold War in 1990 this instrument of 
economic coercion has become a popular tool of 
response to myriad threats to international peace 
and security. They are also used because of their 
being less costly than any military intervention. 
Objectives of sanctions are another area of concern 
for the scholars. These play an important role in 
assessing the conditions and the success or failures 
of a sanction. They can broadly be grouped into 
three categories: Primary objectives, secondary 
objectives and tertiary objectives (Barber 1979). 
There are „primary objectives‟ which are concerned 
with the actions and behaviour of the state or 
regime against which the sanctions are directed- the 
target state. These primary objectives are 
themselves diverse.  
There are secondary objectives relating to the 
status, behaviour and expectations of the 
governments imposing the sanctions- the „imposing 
state‟. The purpose of sanctions here is to 
demonstrate a willingness and capacity to act. The 
example of this intended showcase of power is the 
United States controlling of events of South 
America. Although most studies have concentrated 
on primary objectives of sanctions and still several 
authors have turned to secondary objectives to 
explain why governments have persisted in 
applying them. 
And tertiary objectives, concerned with broader 
international considerations, relating either to the 
structure and operation of the international system 
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as a whole or to those parts of it which are regarded 
as important by the imposing states. Tertiary 
objectives are usually directed to defending or 
further existing structure or organisations. 
It is important to note that, when economic 
sanctions are applied over a lengthy period of time, 
the relative weight of the different objectives of 
sanctions may shift. This is clearly illustrated in the 
case of British sanctions against Rhodesia. Thus, it 
is widely believed that under the right 
circumstances sanctions can achieve or help 
achieve, various foreign policy goals ranging from 
the modest to the fairly significant.  
It is argued that relatively modest goals that do not 
challenge the vital interests of the target country 
are more likely to be achieved than are far reaching 
goals, such as change in the form of government 
and change in its leadership. The smaller the goal, 
the more likely it can be achieved. Similarly the 
lesser the cost of imposing sanctions, the more 
manageable the policy will be to the implementing 
country or alliance of countries. 
Economic sanctions played an important role in 
foreign policy throughout the twentieth century. 
The efficacy of sanctions has been doubted by a 
number of nations but they are still in use. Thus, it 
is rightly said that, „The popularity of sanctions has 
waxed and waned over the years, but they have 
never quite gone out of style‟ (Hufbauer & Schott 
1985). 
In the realm of foreign policy there are no hard and 
fast rules, every situation is unique and different 
from the other and each requires a well-tailored 
policy response. 
SHIFT FROM COMPREHENSIVE TO 
SMART OR TARGETED SANCTIONS 
More Recently, Theorists and practitioners of 
sanctions have moved towards advocating Smart 
Sanctions, they are known to address the 
limitations of the comprehensive sanctions by 
targeting only the political elites in a way that 
closes off escape routes for them and forces them 
to bear the brunt of sanctions. Acknowledging the 
problem of a lack of discrimination and adverse 
effects of comprehensive sanctions, Kimberley 
Elliott and Gary Hufbauer suggests the application 
of so called “Smart Sanction” (Hufbeuer et al. 
1990).  
Smart sanctions are designed to protect vulnerable 
groups, preventing „collateral damage‟ by 
exempting products such as food and medical 
supplies (Tostensen & Bull 2002). They focus 
more on financial coercion, on putting the punitive 
strain only on the elites by blocking their bank 
accounts monetary outflows and arms embargoes. 
Former U.N. Secretary General Boutras Ghali has 
also talked about this “blunt instruments” called 
comprehensive sanctions that afflicts vulnerable 
groups, complicates the work of humanitarian 
agencies and causes long term damage to the 
productive capacity of target nations and even 
penalizes the neighbour. Comprehensive sanctions 
impose heavy suffering on the innocents in target 
countries, hence alternatives to sanctions needs to 
be analysed. 
The concept of Smart Sanctions introduced after 
the humanitarian crisis in Iraq in the 1990s has 
been honed through the War on Terror, and 
sanctions are hitting their targets among corrupt 
elites more often. The role of smart sanctions is to 
identify those responsible and to increase the cost 
to them of engaging in that behaviour found to be 
objectionable in the sanctioning countries 
(Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2000). 
Sanctions tend to be a blunt instrument that often 
produces unintended and undesirable 
consequences. Haiti is a prime example; sanctions 
imposed on this island caused massive economic 
distress. Gibbons and Garfield (1990) demonstrated 
that sanctions resulted in declining incomes, rising 
unemployment decreased attention to child welfare 
and education, poor nutrition and family 
breakdowns. 
Humanitarian exceptions should be included as part 
of any comprehensive sanction, both for moral 
reasons and because allowing a target to import 
food and medicine should make it easier to 
generate and sustain domestic and international 
support. In most cases, it was found that the 
sanctions punish the people more than the regimes. 
The South African Apartheid regime, embargo on 
Cuba, Libya and Iraq are few examples to 
illustrate. 
Apart from this, smart sanctions are employed 
selectively, concentrating on a particular aspect of 
the economy such as oil supplies or unlike earlier 
cases where they were applied on a much wider 
basis. The asset freeze and targeting of Iran‟s oil 
sector by the U.S.A. is one of the examples of such 
smart sanctions. 
Comprehensive and potentially multilateral 
sanctions are bound to inflict the greatest amount 
of economic dislocation on the target country. 
Sanctions are not merely a matter of inconvenience 
and shortages, but of business failures and 
unemployment, energy shortfalls and uncontrolled 
inflation. Sanctions actually tend to increase the 
impoverishment and marginalization within target 
economies, though the evolution of „smart‟ 
sanctions does offer some relief (Patterson 1994).  
Since the 1970s economic statecraft has enjoyed 
resurgence in popularity as an instrument of foreign 
policy. The Iranian asset freeze that followed the 
United states embassy take over, the Soviet Grain 
embargo that followed the military occupation of 
Afghanistan, the Soviet pipeline embargo imposed 
in response to the declaration of martial law in 
Poland are all examples of attempts by countries to 
achieve foreign policy objectives by manipulating 
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economic transactions. The increased use of 
economic leverage as an instrument of the United 
States foreign policy has triggered the debate 
globally over its utility and effectiveness.  
Economic factors are to a great extent affected by 
economically relevant political conditions in 
partner countries. Foreign economic relations are as 
a matter of course part of foreign policy and 
security considerations. In recent as well as past 
history we have seen a series of interventions in 
trade between nations for the purpose of forcing 
good political conduct by means of economic 
pressure. By embargo it is therefore understood a 
government order influencing economic interaction 
and supervision of the domestic economy to 
comply with these policies, which are designed to 
force the opponent into acceptable political 
conduct. 
Due to familiar waiver of cost effective analysis, 
embargo policies resemble a Tiger without teeth or 
claws, a Tiger unable to do more than growl a little 
(Amerongen 1980). The political opponent is not 
disconcerted by measures which have not been 
carefully thought through. Therefore, in the interest 
of all participants there is an absolute requirement 
for consultation with economic experts when 
application of economic weapons for foreign policy 
and security purposes is under consideration. Many 
such decisions brought unexpected results in the 
economic sector and thus have not yielded the 
expected political success.   
Richard Haass has called „Smart or designer 
sanctions‟ only a partial success. He argues that 
leaders and governments have many ways to 
insulate themselves and targeting their financial 
assets is extremely difficult, especially in an 
authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Moreover he 
explains that sanctions should focus as far as 
possible on those responsible offending behaviour 
in the target nation. Such limited sanctions would 
avoid jeopardizing other interest or an entire 
bilateral relationship. And such sanctions would 
also cause less collateral damage to innocents and 
make it easier to garner multinational support. 
Example of such sanction could be U.S. sanction 
against Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear weapon (Haass 
1997).  
David Baldwin notes: “setting economic sanctions 
in the context of choice requires that they be 
defined in terms of means rather than ends. As 
tools of foreign policy, they are presumably 
available to policy makers for a variety of purposes 
and not restricted to particular foreign policy goals” 
(Baldwin 1999). 
Pape argues that sanctions used in the pursuit of 
economic and regulatory disputes or “low politics” 
are different from sanctions used in the pursuit of 
security and political disputes or “high politics” 
and explains the three reasons why they are 
different: first, the option of military force is not on 
the table in matters of low politics. Second, 
sanctions should be more effective in low politics 
cases because the stakes are lower. Third, states 
care only about wealth maximization when 
sanctions are used in low politics disputes; whereas 
high politics cases involve broader security 
concerns, drastically lowering the chances for 
sanctions success. Military force is not an option in 
low politics cases. Though overall military force 
has never proved to be a significant factor in 
generating concessions from the target (Pape 
1997). 
David Cortright and George Lopez, co editors of 
Smart Sanctions noted in 2002 that “the obvious 
conclusion is that comprehensive sanctions are 
more effective than targeted or selective measures. 
Where economic and social impacts have been 
greatest, political effects have also been most 
significant” (Cortright & Lopez 2002). 
Sanctions give national leaders the ability to „do 
something‟, while allowing them to refrain from 
high risk engagements that might result if other 
foreign policy actions, such as military intervention 
were used. Sanctions can be effective foreign 
policy tool when targeted smartly on the ruling 
class of decision makers (Cortright & Lopez 2002). 
SWIFT INCREASE IN SANCTION CASES: 
RECENT EXAMPLES 
Since the first documented sanctions episode in 432 
BC sanctions have remained an important foreign 
policy tool. Prior to the World War II the use of 
sanctions was occasional and often acted as a 
prelude to armed conflict (Duncan 2005). The 
sudden upsurge in sanction cases as pointed by 
various studies was on rise after the end of cold 
war. By far the United States is the leading 
sanctions-imposing country, out of 116 cases 
documented by Hufbeaur et al the United States 
either or in cooperation with its allies has deployed 
sanctions 77 times (Hufbaur et al, 1990). But this 
upsurge subsided a little after the end of cold war, 
when sanctions were imposed on nations as a part 
of superpower rivalry. 
Analyst David Lektzian reported that „since 1990 
alone, economic sanctions were used by the United 
States, Greece, Russia, the United Nations, 
European Union, China, Germany, Belgium, 
France, Saudi Arabia, England, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Japan, the OAU, ECOWAS, MERCOSUR, 
and Turkey to take on both internal and external 
problems‟ (Lektzian 2003). As a consequence of 
the devastating humanitarian effects of the 
comprehensive sanctions against Iraq in the early 
1990s, senders now almost exclusively utilize 
targeted sanctions (Drezner 2011).   
There are many reasons that have been carefully 
analysed by the scholars that played a major role in 
the rise of sanctions episodes as a foreign policy 
tool. One of the key reasons for the rise of 
sanctions is the development of the international 
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economy, the growth of which has exposed new 
vulnerabilities of nations. The interdependence of 
international economy means that even the 
developing countries rely heavily upon 
international trade to supply raw materials and 
technological resources. Hence, such 
interdependence of trade has made the restrictions 
of trade a more viable method of achieving foreign 
policy objectives in comparison with other methods 
of sanctions. The variety and speed of modern 
communication and transportation have also 
dictated the reasons for the boom in sanctions 
episodes. 
An important reason why policymakers therefore 
find sanctions so appealing is also because it allows 
them to show that they are doing „something‟ in the 
face of some wrongdoing, without having to resort 
to the more volatile tools in their repertoire, such as 
war. 
Unless the use of force is quick and successful, 
militarized disputes weaken a nation's resources 
and create a domestic political backlash against the 
sender government. As public resistance to military 
interventions increases, and as foreign aid budgets 
are slashed, policy-makers are turning more and 
more to economic coercion as an attractive 
substitute to advance the national interest (George 
1993; Rogers 1996).  
Other way of looking at sanctions is to note the 
number of states involved. The initiative in 
imposing international sanctions normally rests on 
one or two particular governments; but to make the 
sanctions effective they usually attempt to recruit 
other states and to involve international agencies. 
Thus sanctions may be employed by a single 
government- the united states against Iran; or by a 
group of states- the Eastern bloc against 
Yugoslavia; or by the international community as a 
whole working through an international 
organisations- United Nations against North Korea.  
EVALUATION OF SANCTIONS 
Effectiveness is the most difficult aspect of 
sanctions policy to evaluate. Sanctions are effective 
or ineffective tools of foreign policy can be 
assessed after taking a number of factors into 
account. The decision to impose sanctions is based 
on both political and economic factors like political 
environment of the target country, international 
assistance to the „target‟ or cooperation with the 
„sender‟ and duration of sanctions. Countries with 
multiparty systems, for example changed their 
behaviour in response to sanctions much more 
frequently than authoritarian leaders as stressed by 
David Lektzian (Lektzian 2003). 
Sanction theory analysts, over the years have also 
noticed various factors that are responsible for the 
success or failures of sanctions. They stress that it 
differs from case to case based on the factors like 
duration of sanctions, stability of target country, 
international assistance etc. Careful analysis of the 
many sanctions regimes, the multitude of outcomes 
and the varied circumstances under which 
sanctions were imposed seemed to suggests that 
sanctions are most likely to work when the 
sanctions regime is structured in accordance with 
the goals set out for it. Also, the likelihood of the 
sanctions success depends a great deal on the 
extent to which sanctions are appropriately 
accompanied by other tools (Sullivan 2010). 
Sanctions further affect a nation in two types: 
retributive and rehabilitative. Sanctions may be 
imposed on a state to express disapproval, are 
called Retributive Sanctions. Whereas, Sanctions 
imposed to change the behaviour of the target 
nation, are called Rehabilitative Sanctions. The 
various governments impose sanctions as a form of 
punishment, irrespective of whether they can 
change the policy of the target states (Sullivan 
2001). 
International economic sanctions will never have a 
uniform impact on the citizen of a target country. 
More often than not, the imposition of sanctions 
and the economic distortions and dislocations they 
bring about will lead to gain for some small set of 
target policy (Selden 1999). Poorly implemented 
sanctions also tend to fail. Hence, comprehensive 
sanctions that are widely targeted against an entire 
economy and society bear a heavy moral burden, 
because they impact vulnerable groups- women 
children the poor and elderly- but leave the 
political elites largely untouched. 
Klaus Knorr, a distinguished scholar of 
International Relations, while analysing twenty two 
cases found that sanctions “clearly failed” in 
thirteen cases because the target turned to 
alternative sources for the embargoed good. He 
also noted that the sanctions increased the target‟s 
political will to resist foreign pressure (Knorr 
1977).  
The empirical evidence that exists on the successes 
and failures of sanctions seems to show that there is 
some positive relationship between the amount of 
economic damage and the success of a sanction in 
attaining its political objective (Hufbeaur et al. 
1990). 
Margaret Doxey defines economic sanctions as 
“penalties threatened or imposed as a declared 
consequence of the target‟s failure to observe 
international standards or international 
obligations.” In a general survey of sanctions, 
Doxey concluded that „in none of the cases 
analysed in the study of economic sanctions 
succeeded in producing the desired political 
results‟. Rather, she argued, international isolation 
reduced the chances of a settlement by limiting the 
channels of communication and by making 
understanding more difficult (Doxey 1980).  
Interestingly, the largely ignored fact about the 
sanctions policy is their impact on human rights. 
Michael P. Malloy of the Centre for Human Rights 
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and Humanitarian Law, Washington talks about the 
balance between the deployment of economic 
sanctions and the effects regarding human rights 
concerns. Sanctions, whether imposed to achieve 
the broad policy objectives or in response to human 
rights concern, they usually involve an immediate 
human cost within the target state. The human cost 
of sanctions even those mobilized for legitimate 
reasons, is therefore a cause of concern.  
To conclude, Sanctions, boycotts or embargoes are 
economic measures which should not be adopted 
until all political and diplomatic means have been 
exhausted, even when the past measures have never 
led to the political objective. But few scholars have 
argued that sanctions are also imposed even if the 
sanctioning government expects them to fail, the 
reason being just to satiate public pressure for 
action in a crisis or to direct benefits towards rent 
seeking coalitions (Drury1998; Kaempfer 1988). 
Political coercion marked by breaking diplomatic 
relations and isolating the target country 
internationally has its own drawbacks. A complete 
break in diplomatic relations establishes a hostile 
atmosphere and undermines the political leverage 
available to influence the policies of the target 
country. The Relations between Iran and the United 
States is one such example.  
The US sanctions on Iran provide an interesting 
case for examining these arguments and can shed 
light on how the sanctions‟ effectiveness could be 
improved. The effectiveness of US sanctions on 
Iran has been specifically investigated in a number 
of studies.  
Military intervention may work against certain 
small and even medium-sized countries (Grenada 
and Argentina), but it often seems too dangerous in 
instances where the threat of big-power 
confrontation creeps around (Poland and 
Afghanistan), and military intervention often 
proves ineffective and very costly for both the 
sender as well as the target country. Hence, 
sanctions are considered a better tool to achieve 
foreign policy objectives.  
But it can be easy to impose sanctions, but not so 
easy to know when to lift them up. Sanctions can 
kill and cause wars, just as much as preventing 
them. It should also be understood that sanctions 
are not a substitute for policy and that sanctions can 
hit those citizens in a country who are tried to be 
helped. They can bring untold suffering to the 
population of the target nation. In addition to being 
ineffective and costly, economic sanctions are 
questionable in terms of ethics. 
Over the past few decades, the United States has 
used sanctions as a means to force other countries 
into reducing trade barriers, discourage the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, 
promote human rights, respecting core labour 
standards, thwart drug trafficking, protecting the 
environment and oust governments. The basic idea 
is that the burden of economic hardship imposed by 
sanctions will become intolerable to the citizens of 
the target state, who in turn will pressure their 
leaders to change undesirable policies. 
Overall, the spectrum of instruments of choice is 
not always as clear for a nation‟s foreign policy as 
it is for domestic options, and the range of potential 
effectiveness serves to reflect that. Under the right 
circumstances, sanctions can achieve, or help 
achieve, various foreign policy goals ranging from 
the modest to the fairly significant. 
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